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a b s t r a c t
Resource governance norms have evolved at multiple scales to counter the potential negative socio-
economic, environmental and institutional impacts of the extractive industries. Advocates of these ‘good
governance’ initiatives have sought to mainstream transparency throughout the extractive industries
value chain and implement pro-poor projects at the site level. However, these types of resource
governance interventions often fall short of their promised development beneﬁts. Poorly understood is
how the process of resource extraction and the expectation of supposed revenue windfalls affect the
governance dynamics of host countries and localities. Using a qualitative and inductive approach this
paper highlights emerging spaces of governance within a new petro-state, Uganda. The research ﬁndings
highlight four signiﬁcant governance gaps: lack of coherence among civil society organisations (CSOs);
limited civil society access to communities and the deliberate centralisation of oil governance; industry-
driven interaction at the local level; and weak local government capacity. The ad hoc and fragmented
modes of resource governance in the oil bearing regions, particularly related to transparency and
corporate social responsibility activities, do not bode well for this new petro-state’s development
trajectory. By identifying how spaces of resource governance emerge in new resource contexts, more
proactive and timely interventions can be designed and implemented by state and non-state actors.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Introduction
The extractive industries are expanding into new ‘resource
frontiers’, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, which is character-
ized by increasing levels of political, social, technical and environ-
mental risk (Frynas and Paolo, 2007).1 Some pundits believe that a
signiﬁcant ‘window of opportunity’ exists for the region’s mineral
rich but poor economies to accelerate their development pathways
(UNCTAD, 2007: iii). Proponents of resource-led development, (i.e.
how the extractive industries can contribute to poverty alleviation
and sustainable development in the developing world) argue that
the inﬂow of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country and a
model of export based growth will provide jobs, economic growth
and ultimately, poverty reduction. However, for many resource
rich developing countries pursuing this model, the reality has been
low economic growth, environmental degradation, deepening
poverty and, in some cases, violent conﬂict (Oxfam America,
2001; Pegg, 2006). Many of these countries register abysmally
on the human development index; the resource rich sub-Saharan
African states of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad
and Sudan sit within the bottom 20 places (UNDP, 2011).
The political and economic dimensions of the so-called ‘resource
curse’ are well documented (Auty, 1993; Collier, 2007; Mehlum et al.,
2006; Ross, 1999, 2012; Sachs and Warner, 1995), as are ‘good
governance’ policy prescriptions (Alba, 2009; Humphreys et al.,
2007). However, how resource extraction may (or may not) lead to
pro-poor and sustainable development is poorly understood in
practice. Resource governance norms have evolved at multiple scales
to counter resource curse effects through mainstreaming transpar-
ency and accountability throughout the extractive industries project
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cycle and implementing pro-poor projects at the site level. How the
promised development beneﬁts from ‘new oil’ inﬂuences the govern-
ance dynamics in low income countries particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa lacks critical analysis.
This study uses a qualitative and inductive approach to high-
light emerging spaces of governance within a new petro-state,
Uganda. We explored interactions between state and non-state
actors at and between multiple scales in order to identify key
governance challenges, particularly at the sub-national level. It is
imperative to study how resource governance is being implemen-
ted in these new extractive contexts. Little academic research has
been undertaken on the emerging oil sector in Uganda, particu-
larly in the oil-bearing regions. The paper has three objectives:
ﬁrst, to explore the types of resource governance interventions
employed by state and non-state actors at multiple scales; second,
to assess how state and non-state actors interact to shape and
constrain spaces of resource governance in Uganda; and third, to
tease out the policy relevance of these changing resource govern-
ance dynamics in a new resource context such as Uganda.
To identify ‘spaces of governance’ the paper begins by devel-
oping a multi-scale, multi-actor resource governance typology that
highlights the inﬂuence of transparency initiatives as well as
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. The Ugandan con-
text and research methods are introduced and four key research
ﬁndings are highlighted: lack of coherence of civil society organi-
sations (CSOs); limited civil society access to communities and
increasing state control; industry-driven interaction at the local
level; and weak local government capacity. The paper concludes
by highlighting policy implications for Uganda and other low
income but resource rich countries.
Resource governance
It is well established that petro-states suffer from information,
monitoring and participation deﬁcits over time (Karl, 2007; Ross,
2012). These deﬁcits are manifest both at the local and national
levels. Civil society may not be able to hold international oil
companies or governments to account due to the over centraliza-
tion of power within the executive, ineffective ﬁscal accountability
and increasing rentier culture. Norm entrepreneurs, such as
domestic and international NGOs, think tanks, donors, interna-
tional ﬁnance organizations and even industry associations, have
sought to counteract these negative impacts of resource extraction
through governance initiatives.
A broad deﬁnition of governance includes hard rules such as
regulations, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms, and soft
rules such as norms, standards, expectations, and social
understandings (Levy and Newell, 2005). Resource governance in
this context is deﬁned as the hard and soft rules which shape and
constrain the way hydrocarbons contribute to sustainable devel-
opment and poverty alleviation within host countries. A multi-
scale, multi-actor spatial structure is implicit in the discussion of
how spaces of resource governance may emerge. Fig. 1 identiﬁes
the channels through which resource extraction may be governed
from mandatory to voluntary that occur at and between scales
(Van Alstine, 2014). Within this paper the terms “level” and “scale”
are used interchangeably with regards to the location of jurisdic-
tional authority (Termeer et al., 2010). Two key arenas have
opened to state and non-state actors; these include transparency
initiatives at the international and national levels and CSR activ-
ities at the local level.
International and national levels
Fig. 1 identiﬁes a number of transparency initiatives at the
international and national levels. The emergence and diffusion of
transparency in resource governance norms dates back to four
broad trends that emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s (see e.g.
Benner and Soares de Oliveira, 2010). First, the linkages between
natural resource wealth, economic growth, and poor development
outcomes came under scrutiny, particularly in resource rich
developing countries. This ‘paradox of plenty’ or ‘resource curse’
has led to a vast literature which has explored the economic,
social, political and institutional causes and consequences of this
phenomenon (Auty, 1993; Humphreys et al., 2007; Karl, 1997;
Ross, 1999; Sachs and Warner, 2001). Second, the resource curse
began to be reframed as ‘bad resource governance’, which high-
lighted the political-institutional impacts of resource wealth
(Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006). Third, the interna-
tional community began to engage with issues such as corruption,
human rights and sustainability. Fourth, the legitimacy of multi-
national corporations in developing countries came under intense
scrutiny in the 1990s (Benner and Soares de Oliveira, 2010).
A key event in setting the agenda for transparency in resource
governance was the 1999 Global Witness report, A Crude Awaken-
ing, which highlighted the role of the oil and banking industries in
the plundering of state assets in Angola’s 40-year civil war (Global
Witness, 1999). Another initiative which provided insight into the
institutionalization of the revenue transparency agenda is the
Extractive Industries Review of the World Bank Group, which
was carried out between 2001 and 2004. The Review was initiated
because of protest over the Bank’s poor resource governance track
record (World Bank, 2003, 2004). Revenue transparency in fact
emerged in the Review ‘as one of the few issues that everyone
could agree on’ (van Oranje and Parham, 2009: 39), with Bank
ofﬁcials requiring revenue transparency ‘as a condition for new
investments in the extractive industries sector’ (World Bank,
2004: 4).
In the wake of growing momentum for transparency in
resource governance, a coalition of international NGOs launched
the Publish What You Pay (PWYP) campaign in 2002, which calls
for transparency of company payments and government revenues,
government expenditures, and of contracts and licensing proce-
dures (PWYP, 2011). Also in 2002, the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched by then UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Develop-
ment in Johannesburg. The EITI is a government-driven process,
with 39 countries implementing the EITI standard, which seeks to
strengthen governance in the extractives sector by improving
transparency and accountability through the disclosure of com-
pany payments and government revenues (EITI, 2013). In its
current form, the EITI is an international standard that focuses
quite narrowly on seeking voluntary publication and veriﬁcation
Fig. 1. A resource governance typology.
Source: adapted from Van Alstine (2014).
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of company payments and government revenues from the extrac-
tives sector, whereas, the PWYP is an advocacy organization which
broadens the remit to engage more directly with transparency in
other areas of the extractive industries value chain, such as
expenditure of public funds, and calls for companies and govern-
ment to make these transparency interventions mandatory.
Indeed, momentum has been building to address transparency
and accountability initiatives throughout the extractive industries
value chain (Collier, 2007). The World Bank has published a
working paper on good governance throughout the value chain,
which has ﬁve core components (Alba, 2009): (1) Award of
contracts and licenses; (2) regulation and monitoring of opera-
tions; (3) collection of taxes and royalties; (4) revenue manage-
ment and allocation; and (5) implementation of sustainable
development policies and projects. However, the World Bank’s
conceptualization of the extractive industry value chain as a
template for transparency and information disclosure interven-
tions has limitations. The value chain is depicted as a linear
typology which misses the scalar and temporal dynamics of the
industry, particularly in a ‘new oil’ country context such as
Uganda. In an idealized ‘new oil’ example sustainable develop-
ment and long term poverty reduction policies would be estab-
lished before the petroleum regulatory framework was put in
place, both at the national and sub-national levels.
A mandatory mode of governance represented in Fig. 1 is
extraterritorial legislation such as the US Dodd-Frank Financial
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was approved in July
2010. This Act requires oil and mining companies listed with US
stock exchanges to report their payments to the US and foreign
governments.2 Of course this hard law should beneﬁt host country
citizens as well as home country or US citizens, but those in host
countries are not the intended beneﬁciaries. As indicated in Fig. 1,
there is a lack of mandatory approaches at the local level. In the
Ugandan context, for instance, there is little engagement by civil
society, donors and even local government with local communities
in the villages impacted by oil operations.
Transparency in resource governance in and of itself may not be
capable of facilitating good governance (Hilson and Maconachie,
2009). For example, the disconnect between resource governance
initiatives and local impact, whether due to poor implementation or
the failure to design initiatives in a way that provides meaningful
information to local communities, is a challenge across the extrac-
tive industries (Buxton, 2012). Consensus is building that synergies
with other poverty reduction and sustainable development initia-
tives need to be explored (Scanteam, 2011). One potential synergy is
with CSR initiatives of extractive industry ﬁrms at the regional and
local levels.
Regional and local levels
The direct and indirect interactions the extractives sector has
with resource-bearing communities, local government and tradi-
tional authorities, particularly at the early stages of the project
cycle, are understudied (Luning, 2012). New resource contexts,
such as Uganda’s Albertine Rift region, may be governed through
private or semiprivate means, where authority and control may be
transferred explicitly or implicitly to international oil companies
as a response to state incapacity in providing infrastructure and
basic social services (Ackah-Baidoo, 2012; Soares de Oliveira,
2007; Watts, 2004). These types of interactions are often viewed
as CSR (as indicated in Fig. 1), or a ﬁrm’s (often voluntary)
contribution to sustainable development and poverty alleviation
(Fox, 2004; Jenkins, 2005).
It is thought that through CSR and social investment strategies,
extractive ﬁrms can provide local socio-economic development
where the government is unable or unwilling to do so, and thus
may help mitigate against the potentially harmful impacts of
resource-led growth (Campbell, 2012). The types of CSR and social
investment programmes typical of extractive ﬁrms can encompass
those relating to employment, such as local hiring practices;
environmental impact assessments and mitigation measures; local
community development projects, such as providing safe drinking
water, building health centres and school classrooms, training peer
educators for community health programmes and supplying
equipment; providing micro credit schemes; and scholarships for
youth and women.
In reality, CSR interventions, that is CSR projects and engage-
ment strategies, are a grey area. International oil companies in
some cases have found themselves in the position of effectively
taking over government functions where the state is incapacitated,
such as in Nigeria and Chad (Cash, 2012). The ideal goal is for
private sector development interventions to supplement govern-
ment service provision, to avoid a situation of dependency on the
private sector, and not to impact the willingness or ability of the
state to develop its capacity (Newell and Frynas, 2007). There is
evidence to show that in Uganda’s Albertine Rift region, even at
exploration stage, international oil companies risk being looked at
as some sort of ‘second government’, as communities address their
demands on service delivery to the operating ﬁrms rather than
local government (AmanigaRuhanga et al., 2011).
Extractives companies’ efforts towards local development are also
tied up with securing a ‘social license to operate’ from host commu-
nities, which can help companies mitigate against costly risks in the
future, such as production delays because of employee or local
community action (Gunningham et al., 2004). This further limits the
developmental potential of CSR, because where CSR strategies must
beneﬁt operations, community needs come second (Blowﬁeld, 2005).
Although a myriad of ‘toolkits’ have been developed by international
ﬁnance institutions, practitioners, and industry associations (ICMM,
2005; IFC, 2007; Zandvliet and Anderson, 2009), the ‘community
development’ aspect of CSR remains unsophisticated, has struggled to
evolve as successfully as have the advances in health and safety and
environmental protection, and does little to mitigate the social risk to
corporations (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). Current evidence from
extractive industries in developing country contexts overwhelmingly
points to CSR being inadequate, having a minimal impact, and in
some situations creating more problems for local communities
(Hilson, 2012).
The gap between the drivers of industry and social realities of
communities lead to technocratic CSR approaches that have little
engagement with context speciﬁc political and deep-seated social
issues (Frynas, 2009). The rhetoric of ‘partnership and engagement’
conceals processes of disconnection and power imbalances. It is thus
highly relevant to explore the type and frequency of interactions
international oil companies have with various actors within Uganda’s
oil bearing region. In order to identify the types of resource govern-
ance interventions employed by state and non-state actors at multiple
scales (objective 1), it is also important to explore the interactions of
other actors, such as civil society, donors and government ofﬁcials at
the local and regional levels. The Ugandan context and research study
methods are introduced next.
Background
Although the presence of oil in Uganda’s Albertine Rift region
has been known since the 1920s, with the ﬁrst exploration well
2 In June 2013 the European Parliament voted in favour of similar legislation,
the EU Transparency and Accounting Directives, which will require extractive ﬁrms
to publish payments over €100,000 to governments wherever they operate.
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drilled in 1938 (Kashambuzi, 2010; Miirima, 2008), it was only in
2006 when wildcatters Hardman Resources (Australian), Heritage
Oil (Anglo-Canadian) and Tullow Oil (Anglo-Irish) began to drill
exploratory oil wells with ﬂow rates and oil qualities viable for
commercial exploitation. The extent to which this newly discov-
ered oil wealth will contribute to the achievement of Uganda’s
National Development Plan (NDP), that is “intertwining sustain-
able economic growth with poverty eradication” (Republic of
Uganda, 2010: 3), has been widely debated. President Museveni
heralded this ‘new oil’ with an unsurprisingly paternal response
referring to the resource as “my oil” and reassuring the public that
“the Ugandan oil will be for the present and future generations of
Ugandans”, and that this would be achieved through “the most
enlightened oil utilisation policy” (New Vision, 2007a, n.p.). Some
pundits have remained optimistic that with proper governance
frameworks in place Uganda’s hydrocarbon resources can con-
tribute to broad-based development and poverty alleviation
(Kashambuzi, 2010; Miirima, 2008; The Economist, 2010).
However, Uganda is a ‘hybrid’ state where a veneer of democ-
racy is underpinned by a semi-authoritarian patronage-based
regime (Barkan, 2011; Tripp, 2010). Concern has been raised that
the speed of oil development will outpace the implementation of
both mandatory and voluntary forms of governance throughout
the extractive industries value chain (AmanigaRuhanga et al.,
2011; CSCO, 2010; International Alert, 2009; New Vision, 2007b).
The exploration and pre-production stages of oil development has
increased tensions, particularly in oil-bearing communities
(AmanigaRuhanga et al., 2011; International Alert, 2009). Although
Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) retained
power after a resounding election victory in 2011, the question
remains whether the President will run for a ﬁfth elected term in
2016. The promise of new oil may prove too enticing for Museveni
to let go of power peacefully (Barkan, 2011).
Although having gained recognition for implementing neolib-
eral reforms in the 1990s, which paved the way for an era of
economic growth and positive donor relations, government-donor
relations have deteriorated over the last decade with the govern-
ment hampered by widespread corruption allegations. For exam-
ple, in 2012 most EU donors suspended aid to Uganda after
allegations of embezzlement by the Prime Minister’s ofﬁce, which
is a signiﬁcant concern for the government given that donors
contribute 25 percent of Uganda’s total budget (Nalugo, 2012).
However, the promise of future oil revenues will most likely reduce
Uganda’s reliance upon donor budget support, but may have
deleterious impacts on governance, as one political analyst observed
in 2006: “But of course, depending on how commercial the oil is, his
(Museveni’s) foreign policy will change. He will no longer need donor
money to buy political support” (The Monitor, 2006, n.p.).
It is important to recognise how resource governance in Uganda
interacts with processes of decentralisation. Decentralisation in
Uganda, like in many other developing countries, was adopted as
a means to increase participation in the process of development in
order develop pro-poor policies and achieve poverty reduction.
Decentralised systems have become synonymous with the promotion
of efﬁciency and the enhancement of public services, as well as with
support for more open and accountable forms of government
(Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). Decentralisation has also been
adopted in Uganda as a mechanism to promote sustainable natural
resource management (Lind and Cappon, 2001). However, despite the
fact that decentralisation in Uganda has received political support and
subsequently been described as “one of the most ambitious reforms
undertaken by Uganda since its independence in 1962” (Saxena et al.,
2010: 1), the evidence supporting the extent to which it has achieved
its aim is inconclusive (Saxena et al., 2010; Steiner, 2006). We will
explore how local government has engaged with oil companies and
more broadly the governance of resource extraction.
With regards to the emerging oil sector, as of 2013 about 40
percent of the Albertine Rift region had been explored with over
90 wells drilled and an excellent success rate of close to 87 percent
encountering hydrocarbons (PEPD, 2013). According to Tullow, over
1 billion barrels of oil have been discovered in the Albertine Rift
region. The government claims at least 1.2 billion barrels are recover-
able out of 3.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent in place (PEPD, 2013;
Tullow Oil, 2013b). Although full production of up to 200,000 barrels
per day was targeted for 2015 (Tullow Oil Plc, 2010), this is likely to be
delayed until 2017 (The Independent, 2011).
A variety of governance setbacks at the national level occurred
during 2010–2012, which include corruption allegations towards
Tullow and various government ministers in 2010/2011, a ban by
Parliament in October 2011 on issuing new oil licenses until the
2008 Oil and Gas Policy was implemented, and outstanding issues
with the Government of Uganda with regards to tax, licence
extensions, and consents for Tullow to purchase Heritage Oil’s
interests (see e.g. Vokes, 2012). However, Tullow managed to sign
two Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with the government
in 2012, which enabled Tullow to sell two thirds of its Uganda
licences to the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), a
Chinese state-owned oil company which is one of the largest
exploration and production companies in the world, and Total, the
French major integrated oil company (Tullow Oil, 2013a).
A joint development plan for the Lake Albert Rift Basin
was presented to the President in July 2012, and “constructive
discussions are ongoing” between the three operators and
the government with the hope the plans are “harmonised” so
the development can begin in 2013 (Tullow Oil, 2013a, p. 6). The
complexity of transporting and reﬁning Uganda’s waxy crude (which
needs to be heated to be transported via pipeline) is signiﬁcant.
In June 2013 the government reached an agreement with the oil
companies to develop both a 60,000 barrels per day oil reﬁnery and a
pipeline to transport the crude to a port on the Indian Ocean (Oil in
Uganda, 2013b). The Resettlement Action Plan for the reﬁnery began
in July 2013, with compensation and land acquisition issues dogging
the project (Oil in Uganda, 2013a). Investors are being sought to
ﬁnance the reﬁnery, while a memorandum of understanding has
been signed between Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda to construct two
pipelines across East Africa (PEPD, 2013).
The legacy of border disputes, challenges of managing and
sharing trans-boundary resources, and the lack of mechanisms to
address border disputes in the East African region remains a
worrying prospect (Okumu, 2010). The link between resource
wealth and conﬂict is well documented (Collier and Hoefﬂer,
1998; Le Billon, 2008). The Uganda-DRC border is a ‘hotspot’ due
to mineral riches in the eastern DRC. Uganda has been involved in
illicit cross-border trade in so-called ‘conﬂict minerals’ and is
accused of supporting insurgents in eastern DRC (International
Crisis Group, 2012). The discovery of commercial quantities of
oil in Uganda in 2006 led many to query whether oil would lead
to conﬂict in the region given the strained relations between
Uganda and the DRC and instability in eastern DRC (International
Alert, 2009; Okumu, 2010). Those fears were realised in 2007
when border skirmishes between the two countries led to
violent clashes between troops, which resulted in the death of
a Heritage Oil contractor and six civilians on a Congolese
passenger boat on Lake Albert (International Crisis Group, 2012;
Okumu, 2010).
The increased securitisation and presence of the Ugandan
Patriotic Defence Forces (UPDF) in the oil-bearing region are signs
of increased state control as is discussed below. Finally, the
discovery of commercially viable oil by Tullow in Kenya in 2012
has raised complex questions on regional politics. The extent to
which oil will enhance regional cooperation in East Africa remains
an open question (Besliu, 2013).
J. Van Alstine et al. / Resources Policy 40 (2014) 48–58 51
Methodology
This paper is informed by on-going research which began in
2010 on the governance challenges associated with extracting
hydrocarbons and enabling pro-poor development in Uganda’s
Albertine Rift region (AmanigaRuhanga et al., 2011). A ‘moderate’
constructivist approach and inductive research design is adopted
to explore emerging spaces of governance within this new petro-
state (Esterberg, 2002; Jones, 2002). The ﬁrst objective of the
paper, to explore the types of resource governance interventions
employed by state and non-state actors at multiple scales, is
highlighted in Fig. 1 and discussed above in the section on
resource governance. A review of the academic, NGO and practi-
tioner literature have informed this analysis.
The second objective of the article uses formal and informal
texts to assess how state and non-state actors interact to shape
and constrain spaces of resource governance in Uganda. Formal
text sources include newspapers and electronic resources, policy
documents, NGO reports, press releases and corporate reports.
Informal texts sources are generated from semi-structured inter-
views, focus groups, and participant observation at workshops.
To evaluate the second objective, ﬁeldwork was conducted in
April 2010, November 2011, December 2012, and January, February
and March 2013. Extensive ﬁeld visits to the oil bearing area
include the following districts: Hoima and Buliisa in the Bunyoro
region along Lake Albert; Arua and Nebbi in the West Nile region
of north-western Uganda; Nwoya in the Acholi region of northern
Uganda; and Kanungu and Rukungiri in the Kigezi region of south-
western Uganda. Local government ofﬁcials were interviewed at
the district, sub-county and village levels. Focus groups and
interviews were undertaken in villages, and industry personnel
from Tullow, Total and some contractors were interviewed at their
respective ﬁeld bases in Hoima, Buliisa and Nebbi.
At the regional and national levels, key informant interviews
were conducted with cultural and religious leaders, national
government ofﬁcials, donors, media, industry, and key CSOs/NGOs.
The general frame used for the interviews and focus groups
included a discussion of interactions between actors on oil
governance, the beneﬁts of oil development, barriers to those
beneﬁts, and recommendations on how these issues can be
improved. As data were gathered, core concepts and themes were
identiﬁed, coded and linkages developed. The third objective, to
identify the policy relevance of these changing resource govern-
ance dynamics, is addressed in the conclusion through the analysis
and comparison of objectives one and two. A discussion of policy
implications is integrated into the sections below.
Limitations of this inductive approach include the time avail-
able for data collection and the inﬂuence of the researcher in the
interview/group discussion. Nevertheless, the information gener-
ated during the study exhibited a high degree of consistency
within and across the different groups; thus we have conﬁdence in
the research ﬁndings. It is also relevant to highlight that in order to
identify spaces of resource governance, and subsequent govern-
ance gaps, this article addresses the quantity of interaction as
opposed to the quality of interaction. Further research is needed to
identify the power dynamics and distribution of beneﬁts asso-
ciated with these types and modes of interaction.
Spaces of resource governance
This section explores how state and non-state actors interact to
shape and constrain spaces of resource governance within the
context of ‘new oil’ in Uganda. Fig. 2 summarizes the network of
actors and ﬂows of interactions related to the governance of
Uganda’s oil sector across jurisdictional scales. The shade of arrow
indicates quantity of engagement, that is the darker the arrow the
more frequent the interaction. Types and modes of interaction and
policy implications will be discussed below. These data were
distilled from the interpretation of primary and secondary data,
and Fig. 2 was validated by key stakeholders in Uganda. Four
primary governance gaps emerged from the data: lack of coher-
ence among civil society organisations (CSOs); limited access to
communities and the deliberate centralisation of oil governance;
industry-driven interaction with communities; and weak local
government capacity.
Lack of coherence among CSOs
A key governance gap that emerged from our analysis at the
national and sub-national levels is the fragmentation and lack of
coherence among CSOs. There are three civil society networks in
Uganda on the emerging oil and gas sector: Civil Society Coalition
on Oil and Gas (CSCO), Publish What You Pay (PWYP)—Uganda,
and Oil Watch Network. Interviews with various members of the
CSOs and key donors revealed competing interests and an ad hoc
approach by Uganda’s civil society on the emerging oil and gas
sector.3 Although PWYP-Uganda was established ﬁrst in 2008, it is
still seen as an ‘export’ to Uganda by dominant groups in CSCO,
which was formed in 2009. PWYP-Uganda is a local chapter of
PWYP International which, as discussed above, seeks to promote
transparency and accountability in the extractives sector.4 As of
2011, PWYP-Uganda had 27 members in Kampala and over 30
local/civil society organisations in the oil bearing regions.5
On the other hand, CSCO is a network of over 40 CSOs and
prides itself in being comprised of ‘serious and credible domestic
organisations’, which conduct research, evidence-based advocacy
and high-level government engagement.6 CSCO also develops
connections with local civil society groups to form ‘CSCO chapters’
in the oil bearing regions (the Kigezi, Bunyoro, and West Nile
regions). The Oil Watch Network Uganda was established in 2008
and seeks to promote good governance in oil and gas develop-
ment. Oil Watch has about 20 NGO members, 38 local/host
Fig. 2. Spaces of governance in Uganda’s oil sector.
3 By donors we mean development partners such as the UK Department for
International Development (DFID), Irish Aid, and Norway’s Oil for Development
programme, and private foundations such as the MacArthur Foundation, Ford
Foundation, and the Open Society Foundations.
4 Uganda has yet to sign on to the EITI Standard. The government wants to wait
until oil production begins before implementing the EITI; whereas, civil society
groups are lobbying for the EITI to be implemented before the oil and gas
legislation has promulgated.
5 Interview with PWYP-Uganda member, 22 November 2011.
6 Interview with CSCO member, 11 November 2011.
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community groups, and 50 individual members (NAPE, 2011).
PWYP-Uganda and particularly Oil Watch are more likely to
pursue advocacy and activism strategies at both national and
sub-national levels. However, there is signiﬁcant cross-over, with
some organisations belonging to more than one network.
Concerns have been raised particularly from donors that the
three networks need to be more coordinated and joined up in the
way they address oil and gas issues. As one member of CSCO
highlighted, the way that Oil Watch engages government through
oppositional tactics could ‘close certain spaces’ for engagement.7
Some CSCO members have expressed unease and credibility
concerns about working with Oil Watch and PWYP-Uganda. For
example, in 2011 the three networks were preparing joint com-
ments on a hydropower scheme’s environmental impact assess-
ment. One of the Oil Watch CSOs submitted comments before
CSCO was ready. This example highlights the challenges of
coordinating civil society given different engagement styles and
a fundamental lack of trust between some organisations and
individuals.
The CSCO Five Year Strategic Plan (2011–2015) identiﬁes that
CSOs in Uganda are “uncoordinated, incoherent and operate in
competition” in relation to oil and gas governance issues (CSCO,
2011, p. 16). However, in 2011 at least two donor roundtable
meetings were held with CSOs from the three networks and some
community-based organisations (CBOs) from the oil bearing
regions with the aim to establish a common civil society voice
so as not to confuse the public. The outcome of this initiative was a
Civil Society Advocacy Strategy, which resulted in a joint press
release being issued on behalf of all three coalitions on the
parliamentary debate on corruption in the oil sector (Nalugo,
2011). The Strategy established advocacy objectives on a variety
of oil and gas governance issues, which include: enactment of
petroleum legislation; subscribing to EITI; maintaining biodiver-
sity and ecosystems; community rights protection, awareness, and
mobilisation; citizen participation, oversight, and local content;
and contract transparency.8 Although these joint objectives were
deﬁned, individual organisations were tasked with coming up
with actions.
As of February 2013 little progress has been made on the
coordination of the three networks or implementation of CSCO’s
Five Year Strategic Plan or the Civil Society Advocacy Strategy.
As one member of the coalition noted:
"CSCO faced a number of leadership challenges which ham-
pered positive growth and implementation of work particularly
in 2012. PWYP also had a number of challenges, hence could
not do much as the donors required the network to ﬁrst sort
out the challenges the coalition was facing."9
These organisational and leadership issues highlight the chal-
lenges both internal and external to the three civil society networks.
Leadership and organisational issues as well as coordination issues
between the networks limit their effectiveness.
There has also been duplication of donor and CSO efforts. For
example, in 2011 both the Kampala-based policy think tank
Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE)
and the peace-building NGO International Alert undertook legal
reviews assessing the status of Uganda’s oil and gas legislation.
The donor community was partially responsible for fuelling this
disparate civil society approach because up until 2011 there was
little effort to coordinate donor-funded projects. Not only was the
inﬂux of donor money on oil governance inefﬁcient, it had
inﬂuenced a sort of ‘NGO Dutch Disease’, as one CSCO member
highlighted:
"They know (the donors), and they are trying to ﬁght duplica-
tion because there are also very many CSOs that are abandon-
ing their core business to go to oil, maybe the core business is
no longer so lucrative."10
These negative impacts of donor funding have been mitigated
by on-going donor coordination. Since 2012 there is much more
rigorous cross-checking of applications to minimize duplication of
funded projects.11 In fact, there is now a donor working group on
energy and extractives that has been established by development
partners to enhance coordination.12
A Global Witness report in 2010 highlighted a lack of urgency
and coordination in the collective donor approach on oil and gas
governance issues in Uganda (Global Witness, 2010). It identiﬁed
three ‘camps’ of donors: ﬁrst, those that see oil as a “distant
prospect” and not a concern until revenues begin to ﬂow; second,
those that believe the prospect of oil wealth has already under-
mined their inﬂuence; and third, some donors who have limited
concern over the outcomes and do not have oil and gas pro-
grammes (Global Witness, 2010, p. 5). Donor aid accounted for 25
percent of Uganda’s national budget in 2012/13, but oil revenue
has the potential to double government revenue within 6 to 10
years and constitutes 10 to 15 percent of GDP at peak production
according to the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for
2011–2015. As the Global Witness report highlights, “such an
inﬂux of funding should logically bring Uganda’s aid-dependence
to an end within the foreseeable future” (Global Witness, 2010,
p. 10).
As of 2010, a number of donors were engaging in Uganda’s oil
sector on an individual basis, with a lack of overall co-ordination,
including: Norway with a three year, US$15million programme; the
International Monetary Fund on petroleum revenue management;
the African Development Bank on support for infrastructure; Irish
Aid and the UK Department for International Development (DFID)
with civil society support; and the World Bank on environmental
regulations (Global Witness, 2010, p. 16). More recently, eight
European partners have spearheaded the Democratic Governance
Facility (DGF).13 This joint initiative addresses key governance
challenges in Uganda at multiple scales by funding CSOs and public
institutions through three programme streams: Deepening Democ-
racy; Rights, Justice and Peace; and Voice and Accountability.14 The
latter programme engages directly with accountability issues in the
oil and gas sector. Civil society activities have also been funded
through charities, private foundations, and international NGOs such
as the MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation, Wellsprings Advi-
sors, Open Society Initiative, Revenue Watch Institute, ActionAid
and IUCN.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to map what
activities and organisations each donor has funded, patterns have
begun to emerge. There has been comparatively little work funded at
the community level. This is partly due to the donor and civil society
focus on implementing national level petroleum sector legislation
and the challenges of Kampala-based CSOs getting permission to
pursue village-level engagement as will be discussed next.
7 Interview with CSCO member, 22 November 2011.
8 Interview with CSCO member, 23 November 2011.
9 Email correspondence with CSCO member, 18 February 2013.
10 Interview with CSCO member 14 December 2012.
11 Interviews with CSCO members 13 and 14 December 2012, and interview
with Oil Watch member 13 December 2012.
12 Interview with CSCO member 13 December 2012.
13 The eight partners include Austria, Denmark, the European Union, Ireland,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. This research has been partially
funded by the DGF (see acknowledgements).
14 See DGF Website: http://www.dgf.ug/.
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Limited civil society access to communities and increasing
state control
As identiﬁed in Fig. 2, it is surprising to ﬁnd little evidence of
existing CSOs proactively engaging and pursuing accountability
initiatives at the village level in the oil-bearing districts.15
As discussed above, the limited CSO work pursued at the local
level often aims to ‘sensitise’ communities about transparency and
accountability in the sector, particularly related to the oil laws
being debated in Parliament, and more recently to gather social
baseline data. CSO engagement often focuses at the district or sub-
county level, where civil society representatives call meetings with
local leaders and key stakeholders, not at the village level. There is
an opportunity here for CSOs to engage more proactively with the
oil companies and local governments on development-related
issues in the oil-bearing regions. However, there are a number of
barriers which limit civil society engagement at the local level in
the oil bearing regions.
First, some interviewees indicated that many Kampala-based
NGOs are averse to the ‘hard work’ of community engagement and
mobilization. They prefer to engage with politicians and govern-
ment ofﬁcials through retreats and workshops hosted in the
myriad of hotels in and around the capital. As one NGO leader
said:
"But there is one challenge that still, some of the NGOs are not
yet interested, instead they go there (to the communities) once,
just to account for them to the donors that they have been
there."16
It is evident that ‘civil society’ in Uganda, although ubiquitous,
is not providing the ‘counter voice’ necessary for a ‘politics of
accountability’ to emerge (Newell, 2005). Civil society has been
reacting to what is happening in the industry, and has thus far
been focused mainly at the national level and on ‘sensitisation’
activities. The presence of civil society is assumed to be a sufﬁcient
enough check on transparency and accountability. There are a
number of problems with this assumption. For example, an over-
simpliﬁed idea of civil society in Uganda prevails, without an
analysis of civil society’s competing interests, political agendas, or
manipulations by elite interests. Indeed, as Newell highlights:
“Civil society groups clearly have their own agendas as political
actors, and these may not always be compatible with promoting
the interests of the community” (Newell, 2005: 552). Without
coordination and a shared frame, civil society groups will not
develop the ‘counter discourse’ needed for accountability to occur.
Second, concern has been raised with regards to securitisation
and militarisation of the oil-bearing region (De Kock and Sturman,
2012; Global Witness, 2010; Oil in Uganda, 2012). The army’s
Special Forces Group and police have a signiﬁcant presence in the
oil-bearing region, and there are several private security ﬁrms
operating in the area (Oil in Uganda, 2012). Global Witness
accused President Museveni of “personalization of control” over
oil exploration activity as the President’s son, Brigadier General
Muhoozi Kainerugaba, is in charge of the Special Forces Group in
the region and the President’s younger brother, General Salim
Saleh, owns Saracen Security which provides private security for
some drilling sites (Global Witness, 2010, p. 14). In 2010 there
were reports that an “oil intelligence network using local
informants, to dispel community unrest” was being established,
which has coincided with increased police presence around
drilling sites, particularly in Buliisa (Global Witness, 2010, p. 14).
Indeed, in 2010 when one of the authors was conducting com-
munity focus groups in Buliisa one group said they could not speak
freely because a police informant was watching the proceedings.
This exertion of presidential control and authority over the oil
bearing region has been a signiﬁcant barrier for Kampala and
international NGOs, donors, and media to access communities.
In 2009 the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development issued a
directive that all organisations and individuals wishing to pursue
research and/or advocacy in the oil bearing region must get
Ministry and President’s ofﬁce approval. Gaining access to com-
munities, particularly at the village level in the oil bearing regions,
is controlled by the President’s ofﬁce. Indeed, when pursuing
research in Uganda, protocol dictates that when arriving in a
district the research team needs to report to the Resident District
Commissioner who alerts the District Security Ofﬁcer of your
presence. Through the modalities of decentralisation in Uganda
these positions are appointed by the President, thus they repre-
sent the security arm of the state. In essence, the Resident District
Commissioner and District Security Ofﬁcer control access to
communities. Although not unique to oil, this control by the
President limits the ability of civil society, donors and the media
to engage proactively at the village level.
In order to work around this deliberate centralisation of oil
governance, some national NGOs have partnered with local CBOs
to implement advocacy strategies and foster local oil networks.
Others have challenged the government and gone anyway, risking
arrest. For example, the Chairperson of the National NGO forum, a
national civil society network, was arrested in Buliisa for organis-
ing a meeting on oil sector issues without informing the district.
In another example, a prominent member of the Oil Watch
Network, who regularly engages through the media, noted that:
"When we are organising activities, we work with our CBOs, we
have CBO partners they are in the communities, so when we
are organising in these communities we use the CBOs, in that
community, so they started arresting them."17
He went on to explain that security ofﬁcials would not arrest
him because that would cause “public outcry”, so they would
target local CBOs because “nobody knows them”. Some members
of CSCO, however, have succeeded in getting Uganda National
Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) and President’s ofﬁce
approval for engagement in the oil bearing region. This is a lengthy
process that can take months if not years to complete.18
Industry-driven interaction
An interesting governance gap that emerged from the data was
the lack of actors, other than industry and central government,
interacting at the village level on oil-related issues. The quantity of
interaction that oil companies, including their contractors and
central government have at the local level is indicated by the
darkly shaded arrows in Fig. 2. This is not surprising in and of itself
as drilling companies and their contractors are on the ground
interacting with villagers relatively frequently with regards to
seismic surveys, compensation claims, truck movements, drilling
schedules, CSR activities and casual labour opportunities.
As a community liaison ofﬁcer from Tullow said:
15 Although there are exceptions, see e.g., Greenwatch Uganda’s guide for
community-based monitoring of oil and gas activity impacts (http://www.green
watch.or.ug/); the Africa Institute for Energy Governance’s work with communities
affected by the proposed oil reﬁnery in Hoima (see: http://www.aﬁego.org/); the
author’s work on community-driven accountability in the oil-bearing region (see:
AmanigaRuhanga et al, 2011).
16 Interview with Oil Watch member, 13 December 2012.
17 Interview with Oil Watch member, 13 December 2012.
18 It took the authors over a year from 2009 to 2010 to get initial permission to
begin research in the oil bearing region.
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"During the exploration period Tullow has a strategy of how to
engage with the community because we cannot avoid them, we
are working on their land."19
What is striking is that industry has signiﬁcantly more contact
with villages on oil issues than do other stakeholders, including
local government and CSOs. It is remarkable how little interaction
CSOs, CBOs and local government ofﬁcials actually have with local
communities on oil issues. As one local farmer from Buliisa District
said: “… we have never seen government ofﬁcials in our area.”20
An LC1 chairperson from the same village said: “… government
interacts with community leaders only in workshops.”21,22 Com-
pany representatives also identiﬁed the weak capacity of local
government. For example, members of Tullow’s stakeholder
engagement team highlighted that “central government should
empower local government”23 and “government should do its role
for informing people.”24
There was some evidence from our interview data and analysis
of guest entry books held by LCIs and LCIIIs that CSOs/CBOs
engaged at the sub-country and district levels, but little evidence
that they engaged at the village level (see Table 1). This is partially
explained by the above discussion on the challenges of accessing
communities with the appropriate permissions and also by the
focus on national level issues, such as the oil and gas policies, by
domestic CSOs and the international community.
With regards to industry-community interaction, according to
Tullow there is once a month or more frequent interaction with
different sub-national actors, such as LCI, LCIII and LCV local
government ofﬁcials, as well as CSOs, religious and cultural
leaders. The type of interaction with these various actors includes
business updates, project updates, problem solving and casual
visits. Tullow, for example, seeks to engage with 32 villages in
Buliisa. From our analysis of LCI guest books and interviews, visits
by Tullow were rather ad hoc and certainly not as frequent as
monthly. For example, Table 1 details the types of direct interac-
tions Kijumbya, a village of about three hundred households in the
district of Buliisa, has had with the oil sector since 2007. Most of
these interactions are direct with Tullow and its contractors, such
as environmental impact assessment (EIA) consultants, security
services, and organisations implementing CSR projects.
The interaction at the village level is devoid of CSOs and CBOs
engaging on oil sector issues independent of Tullow. District
level government ofﬁcials are also largely absent. Regular interac-
tion is through central government ofﬁcials, i.e. the Petroleum
Exploration and Production Department (PEPD) and sub-county
ofﬁcials accompanying Tullow. Also notable is the role of the
transnational corporation G4S security services. In 2011, as ten-
sions began to rise on compensation and grievance issues related
to crop damage from seismic surveys, drilling and road construc-
tion, G4S increasingly accompanied Tullow when it visited the
village.
Although there is interaction between donors, NGOs, industry
and government ofﬁcials at quarterly stakeholder meetings and
formal events, there appears to be little collaboration or engage-
ment from NGOs or donors on how companies could improve
company-community relations and the potential for development
beneﬁts at the village level. NGOs and donors also do not appear to
be signiﬁcantly engaged with building local government capacity
to engage with oil sector issues. As has been identiﬁed in the
National Development Plan and the Africa Peer Review Mechan-
ism (APRM) report on Uganda, the decentralised system for service
delivery suffers from signiﬁcant structural, operational and ﬁnan-
cial weaknesses. However, Local Councils (LCs), NGOs and local
businesses have engaged successfully on various local health and
education initiatives (APR Panel, 2008: lix), thus it is important to
include LCs in the engagement process and action planning
between community leaders and oil companies.
It is clear that there is a signiﬁcant governance gap at the local
level, where interactions between company and community are
taking place in a seemingly unchallenged arena. CSR in this
context, which relies on the company’s interpretation of their long
term self-interest and the need to ensure social legitimacy, is
insufﬁcient as a governance mechanism, not least because CSR
approaches typically underestimate the importance of power
between company and community actors (Garvey and Newell,
2005). This power imbalance usually means that communities,
which lack ﬁnancial resources and are marginalised from decision
making, do not have a means of holding corporate actors to
account, and companies tend to have different perceptions of
what constitutes development (Blowﬁeld, 2005). And, in such
cases, a vocal and well-mobilized civil society is seen as one key
ingredient for accountability measures to take place (Frynas,
2009).
Indeed, in the Ugandan case, impacts at the local level are not
being met by a counter-voice or challenge. Companies engage with
communities out of need to gain access to land, carry out
exploration activities, and as a consequence there is a one way
information ﬂow, and no clear grievance mechanisms estab-
lished.25 The minimal civil society and donor support for local
CSOs means that there has been little fostering of the conditions
necessary for accountability to emerge. Civil society action in
Uganda is lagging behind developments in industry, and donors
and civil society actors alike are missing the opportunity to
Table 1
Oil sector related interactions in Kijumbya village, Buliisa district.
Source: our analysis of LCI guest books and interviews.
2007 Government introduces Tullow to village; Tullow recruits some casual labour from village
2008 Tullow when conducting its EIA
2009 Tullow and PEPD ofﬁcial on issues related to well drilling and road building; Tullow, Busoga Trust (a borehole subcontractor) related to borehole planning
and the LC3 and LC5 Chairs visit for borehole handover; Tullow for introduction of HIV/AIDS peer educators
2010 Tullow, PEPD, sub-county ofﬁcials and G4S security services related to seismic testing, well drilling and compensation issues/payments; Tullow
for EIA consultation and peer educator meetings; Hofokam Ltd, a subcontractor, for Tullow credit and savings programme
2011 Tullow for well drilling; Tullow and District Environment Ofﬁcer to distribute textbooks; Tullow, PEPD, sub-county ofﬁcials and G4S security services
for sensitisation, compensation and complaints/grievances regarding seismic surveys; Hofokam Ltd for Tullow credit and savings programme
2012 Tullow, PEPD on compensation for seismic surveys; Tullow, PEPD for seismic survey impact audit; Hofokam Ltd for Tullow credit and savings programme
19 Interview, 7 December 2012.
20 Interview, 8 December 2012.
21 Interview, 8 December 2012.
22 There are ﬁve tiers of local government. Rural areas are divided into districts
(LCV), counties (LCIV), sub-counties (LCIII), parishes (LCII) and villages (LCI). Urban
areas are composed of municipalities and towns (LCIV), whereby municipalities are
then further split into divisions (LCIII), wards (LCII) and zones (LCI).
23 Interview, 5 December 2012.
24 Interview, 6 December 2012.
25 Although Tullow and Total have begun to establish their own grievance
mechanisms.
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facilitate the development of broad based social movements in
response to impacts at the local level during the exploration phase.
Weak local government capacity
As highlighted from the discussion above, a key governance
challenge is the capacity and mandate of local government to
engage with oil issues at the village level. Across the study districts
there were varying degrees of interaction between local govern-
ment ofﬁcials and local communities on oil issues. Although some
ofﬁcials reported more of an active role, for example, ofﬁcials in
the Natural Resources Departments, their ability to share and
disseminate information with local communities was limited by a
lack of information and lack of resources to carry out such
activities.
As a result of insufﬁcient funds and the often large distances
between district headquarters and villages impacted by oil opera-
tions (sometimes over 80 km on poor roads), district ofﬁcials
spoke of the difﬁculty in mobilising and speaking to communities
without being given sitting allowances. District Environment
Ofﬁcers, responsible for monitoring compliance with the EIAs,
noted that their budgets were insufﬁcient for monitoring the
activities of oil companies. There were also cases where site visits
by the Environment Ofﬁcers were given transport to and from the
sites by the oil companies, which raise questions about the
independence of these assessments. A Community Development
Ofﬁcer stressed that local government has been neglected in the
oil and gas legislation, that they “need a budget to organise
sensitisation in the community to run their own programmes so
that people are prepared,” and that “local government is vulner-
able because they don’t have the information.”26 This resonates
with other work on decentralisation in Uganda which identiﬁes
technical capacity deﬁciencies in local governments as a major
constraint (Onyach-Olaa, 2003).
The research team’s meetings with LC authorities (I, III, and V)
conﬁrmed that these local representatives are largely spectators of
developments in the oil sector. They are almost completely
excluded from the policy, legal and institutional formulation,
implementation and monitoring in the oil sector. Their limited
involvement seems to be largely connected to security issues
through the District Internal Security Ofﬁcers and sub-county or
Gombolola Internal Security Ofﬁcers who are political and techni-
cal appendages of central government. The growing ineffective-
ness of the LC system may be largely due to the fact that it is a
political captive of the ruling NRM regime that is dominated by a
president who has all the power and the willingness to exercise it
for regime survival (Tripp, 2010).
A reoccurring question from LC authorities and district ofﬁcials
during our regional stakeholder workshops was on their entry
point into the oil and gas sector. Indeed, when central government
representatives come to ‘sensitise’ local communities with the oil
companies, the role of local government is unclear. In the decen-
tralised system, the role of central government is to take overall
responsibility for national issues, which speciﬁcally includes: the
formulation of national policies, standards and services; monitor-
ing the implementation of such policies and services; and ensuring
compliance with national standards and regulations. However, in
practice the roles and responsibilities of various levels of govern-
ment on oil matters are unclear. From our interviews and work-
shops local authorities believe that central government and local
government “are not one government” on oil governance. They
largely believe local government are as uninformed and disem-
powered as communities.
The existing governance structure does not create a focal
person or department for oil issues at district level or below.
Evidence suggests that the Technical Planning Committees, made
up of all heads of department in each district, are limited in terms
of sharing and disseminating information with lower levels of local
government. However, supported by the Netherlands develop-
ment organisation SNV in 2012, representatives from local govern-
ment and civil society in Nebbi District formed an Oil and Gas Task
Force to act as a focal point for oil issues, e.g. complaints. There
was little evidence that this Task Force was acknowledged as a
focal point by central government. Furthermore, such committees
were not found in other study districts, highlighting inconsistency
in current oil governance across the oil bearing regions.
These challenges link to broader concerns in Uganda about the
decentralisation process in practice (Steiner, 2006). There has in
fact been a process of over-decentralisation in Uganda through
district creation: 33 districts in 1980; 56 in 2000; 80 in 2006; and
112 in 2011 (Fountain Publishers, 2011; Green, 2010). District
creation has been described as a politics of patronage that
weakens the administrative, logistical and technical capacity of
local authorities (Green, 2010). Also of relevance is the role of the
Bunyoro Kingdom, which is a cultural institution outside of formal
political structures but none the less politically important. Two oil
districts, Hoima and Buliisa, are part of the Kingdom. The tradi-
tionally marginalized Banyoro have sought 12.5 percent of the oil
revenues, but the Public Finance Bill, which is before Parliament in
2013, has recommended that all Kingdoms and Districts share
seven percent (Ssekika, 2013). How the Banyoro are mobilising at
the local level, e.g. through or outside of the LC system, is an
interesting area for further research.
Evidence suggests that despite the rhetoric of participation in
managing natural resources, when it comes to oil issues, including
information, planning and decision making, the process is in fact
highly centralised. The district, county and sub-county levels of
local government appear to have been bypassed when it comes to
handling oil issues. This is demonstrated by inadequate dissemi-
nation of information among district ofﬁcials and LCs on oil issues,
lack of technical capacity or investment to enable district and LC
ofﬁcials to handle oil issues, and the subsequent constraints this
places on local authorities in their ability to take an active role in
oil matters.
Parliament also has been relatively ineffective in checking
executive power. A key parliamentary debate on the Petroleum
(Exploration, Development, Production) Bill occurred in 2012 over
whether or not the minister in charge of petroleum should have
control over exploration and production licensing (known as
Clause 9) among other issues. After much controversy, with ﬁve
NRM MPs openly voting against the bill, it passed through
Parliament with Clause 9 intact in December 2012. As one NRM
MP highlighted: “the President tried to stop Parliament from
meeting on oil … to silence those people who speak for the
majority.”27 CSOs noted that their lobbying strategies had failed
because of the limited power of MPs to inﬂuence the oil bills.28
However, stakeholders from our regional workshops said that MPs
did not consult them at all before voting on the oil bills in 2012 or
even the oil and gas policy in 2008.
Given the lack of local government capacity and increased
central government control, it appears as though authority is
being implicitly (or even explicitly) transferred to the international
oil companies operating in the oil bearing regions, particularly
26 Interview, 10 December 2012.
27 Interview, 18 June 2013.
28 National stakeholder workshop, June 2013.
J. Van Alstine et al. / Resources Policy 40 (2014) 48–5856
through CSR projects around issues such as infrastructure, con-
struction and maintenance, and even health and education. These
characteristics of oil-producing enclaves are all too common
(Ferguson, 2005; Soares de Oliveira, 2007; Watts, 2004). For
example, Watts (2004) highlights how Nigerian petro-capitalism
(dis)functions through a “double movement”. On the one hand,
ﬁscal centralism underpins a process of nationalism and state
building, and, on the other, a politicized process of oil-led devel-
opment in oil-producing regions “has fragmented and discredited
the state and its forms of governance” through the logic of ethnic
claims making (Watts, 2004, p. 204). We can already see the
process of resource nationalism occurring through Museveni’s
increased state control of the emerging oil sector, and heightened
regional politics where cultural institutions such as the Bunyoro
Kingdom argue for earmarked royalties.
Conclusion
This paper highlights emerging spaces of resource governance
within a new petro-state, Uganda. We identify how modes of
private and semi-private resource governance such as transpar-
ency initiatives at the national level and CSR interventions at the
sub-national level are potential pathways through which resource-
led development is advocated and sought.
We have assessed how state and non-state actors interact to
shape and constrain spaces of resource governance in Uganda. We
identify four key governance gaps: lack of coherence among CSOs;
limited civil society access to communities and increasing state
control; industry-driven interaction at the community level; and
weak local government capacity. Through limited civil society and
donor response, increased state control and failing decentralisa-
tion there are signiﬁcant information, monitoring and participa-
tion deﬁcits emerging in this nascent petro-state, particularly at
the sub-national level. By identifying how spaces of resource
governance, using a multi-actor, multi-scale framework, emerge
in new resource contexts, more proactive and timely interventions
can be designed and implemented by state and non-state actors.
We now explore the policy implications of these changing
resource governance dynamics.
We recommend that donors and civil society coordinate efforts
more proactively to engage in research-driven engagement at the
local level, for example, much earlier in the feasibility and
exploration stages of the extractive industry project cycle. How-
ever, with the constraints associated with gaining access to the
local level in the oil-bearing region of Uganda this will remain a
challenge. A starting point is to map out what activities and
organisations each donor has funded in order to identify emerging
engagement strategies and patterns. It is also unlikely that a
domestic or internationally-driven social movement will inspire
a ‘politics of accountability’ at the sub-national level given the lack
of shared discourse and coordinated efforts among civil society
groups. More leadership can be shown by CSCO, PWYP-Uganda,
and Oil Watch-Uganda in coordinating civil society efforts.
To this end, it would be useful to pursue more comparative
work on how extractive contexts in Africa compare with those in
Latin America, where diverse social movements have acted as an
important counter voice (Bebbington et al., 2008). In Latin Amer-
ica, the legacy of centuries of plunder by foreign interests has built
strong social movements, and the key to the success has been the
ability of these diverse actors to ﬁnd a common frame for the
struggles (Spronk and Webber, 2007). This ‘shared frame’ cannot
be easily assumed for Uganda, even though some commentators
have pointed to the shared experience of the country’s past civil
conﬂict as a uniting legacy. The Bunyoro Kingdom and some
activist-oriented CSOs have sought to highlight issues of fairness,
rights and justice in the oil-bearing region. The extent to which
these counter-discourses amount to a social movement remains to
be seen.
There are also roles to be played by industry and local
government. Industry in the Ugandan context is made up of three
international oil companies, Tullow, Total and CNOOC, and their
wide variety of contractors. More coordination is needed between
corporate interventions and stakeholder engagement at the local
level. As of March 2013 there was limited evidence of the extent to
which the international oil companies’ various CSR projects will
contribute to the National Development Plan and/or District
Development Plans. Civil society should proactively engage with
industry to help formulate, monitor and evaluate their plans.
Finally, there is a signiﬁcant opportunity for local government to
engage more proactively both with central government and local
communities (i.e. at the sub-county, parish and village levels).
Donors and civil society should target research-led engagement
that will help overcome these growing information, monitoring
and participation gaps within local government.
This paper has identiﬁed how the promised development
beneﬁts from ‘new oil’ inﬂuences the governance dynamics in
Uganda. The extent to which these ﬁndings are replicable to other
new resource contexts and more established extractive regions
requires further research. The ad hoc and fragmented modes of
resource governance in the oil bearing regions do not bode well for
this new petro-state’s development trajectory.
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